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‘All contractual liability [is] voluntarily undertaken’1  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Voluntary assumption of liability is an idea that naturally belongs to the province of the law of Contract.  It is 
the obvious basis of contractual liability. It is not an obvious basis of liability in Tort or Delict, where 
traditionally obligations have been seen as imposed ex lege. This paper examines recent developments in the 
English law of negligence that have placed this idea at the centre of tortious liability, analyses this concept and 
considers the implications of these developments for the future of both Tort and Contract. 
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1 Lord Hoffmann in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48, Times, July 10, 2008, 
where he said, stating, perhaps, the obvious, that liability for damages in contract had to be founded on the intention 
of the parties, objectively ascertained, because all contractual liability was voluntarily undertaken. 
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1. Falling through the boundary between contract and tort 
 
Voluntary assumption of liability is an idea that naturally belongs to the province of the law of 
Contract2. It is the obvious basis of contractual liability, protected in modern legal systems from 
unconscionable restrictions of the freedom of Contract, imposed by a party’s unequal bargaining 
power. But whereas it is obvious that there should be, in principle, no Contract3 without an 
assumption of liability by the parties, the reverse is not obvious: namely, that the law should only 
give effect to an assumption of liability if there is a valid Contract between the parties. This may be 
so because: 
 
1. The parameters of the formation of a valid Contract are too narrowly defined in a legal system 
(such as in the English, under the rules of the Doctrine of Consideration). These parameters may be 
kept narrowly defined for wider policy reasons, that do not satisfy the legal system’s developing 
judgment as to what is just, fair and reasonable, in certain situations of direct dealings between two 
parties. Allowing for an (objective) assumption of liability to operate as the basis of extra-contractual 
liability can remedy the injustice, avoiding an interference with the (valued) narrow definition of a 
valid Contract. 
 
2. Although the parameters of the formation of a valid Contract are reasonably wide, restrictions 
imposed in a legal system on liability in Tort (i.e. limitation of claims in time, narrowly defined 
vicarious liability and heads and size of damages) may not allow the fair treatment of claims arising 
out of direct dealings between the parties, in situations in which a valid Contract cannot be inferred, 
the generous conditions of formation of Contracts, recognised by the legal system, notwithstanding 
(this is the case, for example, in German law). 
 
3. Finally, assumption of liability may be used as the basis of extra-contractual liability in order to 
provide a means of limitation of liability for difficult types of negligent harm. Indeed, the idea of 
assumption of responsibility as the basis of extra-contractual liability first came into existence in 
English law in connection with claims for the compensation of types of non-intentional harm other 
than physical personal injury, notably, psychological and psychiatric harm, nervous shock and pure 
economic loss.  
 
These types of harm are difficult to compensate. The main difficulty lies in the severe policy 
objections to their compensation, based on their potential of being large in extent and wide-spread, 
creating a risk of liability far wider than what the courts can realistically impose on the defendant 
and society at large that will, one way or another, have to absorb the losses (e.g. by insurance or 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Jennings v Forestry Commission 2008 WL 2148122 (CA (Civ Div)), [2008] EWCA Civ 581 (no assumption of 
responsibility by employer to an independent contractor for injuries sustained during the performance of a contract of 
service); Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd (formerly Dunlop Heywood Lorenz Ltd) v Erinaceous Insurance Services Ltd (formerly 
Hanover Park Commercial Ltd) [2008] EWHC 520 (Comm). 
 
3 Subject, of course, to recognised restrictions of the freedom of Contract. 
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other market mechanisms). A blanket denial of liability is, however, unacceptable, and the law is 
engaged in a search of a new basis of realistic, limited liability in tort, for such losses. In doing this, 
English law is seeking ways of limiting liability in Negligence which, under the original design of 
this tort4, would only depend on proof of foreseeable harm. In English law the idea of assumption of 
liability is now expressly used as an autonomous basis of a Duty of Care in Negligence, and is also 
lurking behind two other techniques, known as the three-fold test of the Duty of Care, and the 
incremental approach to expanding liability, both of which are considered later on in this paper. 
 
In an important legislative intervention, the well-known restricted conception of Contract and 
Contractual liability under English law was enlarged. The legislative intervention in question was 
the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. The Act reformed the rule of Privity of contract 
under which a person can only enforce a contract if she is a party to it. Moreover, the Act provided5 
that, where a third party has a right under the contract, the contracting parties may not, by 
agreement, rescind or vary the contract in a way which affects the third party's right without her 
consent. This section uses the term variation in its legal sense, i.e. a variation of the terms of an 
agreement, by further agreement between the parties to the original agreement. It does not, for 
example, affect the possibility of a construction of contract which could allow one of the parties 
unilaterally to alter, or “vary”, the details of performance; such a variation is not to the contract but 
only to the mode of performance6. 
 
This Act has largely removed the blocking effect of the doctrine of Privity of Contract on third party 
rights, but the doctrine still applies, albeit now to a limited extent, with regard to third party liabilities. 
For, as the Law Commission for England and Wales, the proposals of which are enacted in the new 
legislation, emphasised in its report on this subject, the proposed abolition of the doctrine of Privity 
should not affect the self-evident principle that strangers should not have obligations forced upon 
them by a contract between others7 . Significantly, the Act ensures8 that references in its sections 
such as “if the third party had been a party to the contract” are not to be interpreted as  meaning that 
the third party should be treated as a party to the contract for the purposes of any other enactment. 
                                                 
4 In Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A. C. 562. 
5 Section 2 (1). 
6 But, Section 2 (3) provides that subsection (1) is subject to an express term of the contract, that the contract can by 
agreement be rescinded or varied without the third party's consent or that the third party's consent is to be required in 
specified circumstances different to those which are set out in subsection (1). And Subsections (4) and (5) give the 
court or arbitral tribunal the power to dispense with the requirement for the third party's consent where it cannot be 
obtained because his whereabouts are unknown or he is mentally incapable of giving his consent or where it cannot 
reasonably be ascertained whether he has in fact relied on the contractual term. 
7‘It would be an unwarranted infringement of a third party's liberty if contracting parties were able, as a matter of 
course, to impose burdens on a third party without his or her consent. Our proposed reforms do not, therefore, seek 
to change the ‘burden' aspect of the Privity doctrine or the exceptions to it’: Law Commission Report No 242, 
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc242.pdf). 
 
8 Section 8 (4). 
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One example is section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which applies “as between 
contracting parties where one of them deals as a consumer or on the other's written standard terms 
of business”. The new Act makes it clear that nothing in its provisions means that “contracting 
parties” in section 3 of the 1977 Act includes a third party with a right enforceable under this Act. 
This shows that, even after this new legislation came into force, it remains in principle unjustifiable, 
being an infringement of individual autonomy and voluntary assumption of liability as foundations 
of contractual responsibility, for a third party to be charged with the burden of the negative effect of 
a Contract between others on his liabilities. But the Act has largely removed the obstacle of lack of 
consideration and Privity for a third party to receive the benefit of the positive effect of a Contract 
between others on his liabilities. 
 
These limitations of this new statute, and the Doctrine of Consideration which remains unaffected, 
have led the courts to a development of remedies in Tort, in cases in which losses that would 
otherwise qualify as caused by a breach of Contract are left uncompensated. These remedies come 
under the umbrella of the new idea of voluntary assumption of responsibility, an idea that is strongly 
reminiscent of the basis of contractual liability itself, which is, of course, the assumption of 
obligations by agreement between the parties. 
 
 
2. The rise of voluntary assumption of liability in tort 
 
The idea of voluntary assumption of responsibility outside a Contract9 made its first appearance in 
English law in connection with claims for the compensation of economic loss10, and in the seminal 
decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne v Heller11, where it was decided that a Bank can be 
liable for a negligent information supplied without consideration to a regular client. In the more 
recent case of Henderson v Merrett Syndicate Ltd12, Lord Goff, in looking for the principle which 
underlay the decision in Hedley Byrne, referred to passages in the speeches of Lord Morris and Lord 
Devlin in that case including a passage in the speech of Lord Devlin where he considered the sort of 
relationship which gave rise to a responsibility towards those who act upon information or advice, 
and thus created a Duty of Care towards the person so acting. Lord Devlin had said:   
 
“I do not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility imposed by law upon certain 
types of persons or in certain sorts of situations. It is a responsibility that is voluntarily accepted or 
undertaken, either generally where a general relationship, such as that of solicitor and client or banker and 
customer, is created, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction.”  
 
 
                                                 
9 E. K. BANAKAS (2000). 
 
10 E.K. BANAKAS (1999), E.K. BANAKAS (1998), E.K. BANAKAS (1996), E.K. BANAKAS (1989). 
 
11 [1964] A C 465 (H.L.). 
12 [1995] 2 AC 145, [1994] 3 All ER 506. 
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Lord Goff added in Henderson :  
 
“From these statements, and from their application in Hedley Byrne, we can derive some understanding of 
the breadth of the principle underlying the case. We can see that it rests upon a relationship between the 
parties, which may be general or specific to the particular transaction, and which may or may not be 
contractual in nature. All of their Lordships spoke in terms of one party having assumed or undertaken a 
responsibility towards the other.”  
 
In White v Jones13 (see infra) Lord Goff stated again that the Hedley Byrne principle was “founded 
upon an assumption of responsibility.” In Galoo Ltd (In liq) & Others v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) 
and another14 the Court of Appeal set out to identify the difference between the facts there and those 
in its previous decision in Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd15, that allowed the recovery 
of an economic loss. The question was when is an adviser, e.g. in this case, an auditor, in close 
proximity with a person suffering loss by relying on his negligently false advice or information? The 
answer given by the Court of Appeal in Galoo was, when the auditor 'intends' that the third party, a 
particular identified person, will rely on it16. Thus the bidder relying on the auditor's accounts of the 
target company in Galoo had his claim dismissed, because, although he was personally known to the 
auditor, it was not 'intended' by the latter that he should rely on his accounts. The leading judgment 
of Glidewell L. J. relied on Lord Denning's so-called 'classic statement’ in Chandler v Crane Christmas 
& Co. 17. The auditor's 'intention' was meant as referring to his knowledge, and willingness, of the 
reliance of the plaintiff, not any willingness to inflict on him financial injury through such false 
information. It must be noted here that a professional making a false statement in the course of doing 
his every day job, on the subject-matter of his expertise, will find it hard to shift a presumption of 
negligence in the error.  The idea of a 'voluntary assumption of responsibility' was used to explain 
the importance of 'intended reliance', and in Galoo it was turned into a new concept of a 'voluntary 
inter-personal’ relationship, said to fall short of being a contract only because of lack of consideration 
proceeding from the plaintiff to the defendant in return for the advice or information18. In Coulthard 
and others v Neville Russell (a firm)19 , the Court of Appeal, in another case concerning the civil liability 
                                                 
13 [1995] 2 AC 207, [1995] 1 All ER 691. 
14 [1995] 1 All ER 16 (CA). 
15 [1991] Ch. 295. 
16 See [1995] 1 All E R 16, 37 per Glidewell L. J.; 43-44 per Evans L. J. 
17 [1951] 2 KB 164, at 179-184, see supra. 
18 [1995] 1 All ER 16, 44 per Evans L.J. 
19 [1998] 1 BCLC 143. The facts were as follows: A company acquired the shares of another company of which the 
plaintiffs were directors. The defendant firm of accountants were appointed auditors of the second company. The first 
company had borrowed money to purchase the shares of the second and originally it was planned to repay the loan 
out of dividends declared by the second company. Subsequently, in order to maintain the appearance of capital 
adequacy in the accounts of the second company, it was suggested that the second company would make a number of 
loans to the first company to enable it to pay off its loan made in order to acquire it. in fact, these loans by the second 
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of accountants acting as auditors, considered the issue whether in their function as auditors 
accountants owed a duty of care to the directors of the audited company to warn on unlawful 
financial conduct. The Court of Appeal held that the liability of professional advisers for failure to 
give correct advice or accurate information was in a state of development. It was not possible to say 
that the present claim was bound to fail and therefore the appeal of the auditors should be 
dismissed. This was an area 
 
“…in which the law is developing pragmatically and incrementally. It is pre-eminently an area in which the 
legal result is sensitive to the facts”.  
 
In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc & others20, the plaintiff had applied for work in the financial 
services industry and sought a personal reference letter from his former employers, a leading 
insurance firm. The employment rules of the financial services industry required that such a 
reference be sought and given. It was given, but it was unfavourable, and was found by the trial 
judge to constitute a negligent misstatement.  
 
In the House of Lords it had to be considered whether a duty of care was owed to the plaintiff. Lord 
Goff reached an affirmative conclusion on the basis of Hedley Byrne. He said:  
 
“Where the plaintiff entrusts the defendant with the conduct of his affairs, in general or in particular, the 
defendant may be held to have assumed responsibility to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff to have relied on the 
defendant to exercise due skill and care, in respect of such conduct”.  
 
But both Lord Goff and Lord Woolf approved in Spring the decision of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in South Pacific Manufacturing Company Limited v New Zealand Security Consultants and 
investigations Ltd21, where it was held that an investigator reporting on the causes of a fire to an 
insurance company owed no duty of care to the insured whose claim was rejected because of the 
allegedly inaccurate report. Lord Goff found that there had been no assumption of responsibility by 
the investigator to the insured in that case, and Lord Woolf said that the report of the investigator 
was made pursuant to their contractual duty to the insurer.  
 
Another, recent, example of similar type is Baker v Kaye22. The High Court held that a medical 
                                                                                                                                                        
company to the first constituted a breach of s 151 of the Companies Act 1985. The second company’s Directors were, 
as a consequence, disqualified under the relevant legislation. They were now suing the auditors of the company 
alleging that they owed them a duty of care to warn them that the loans were unlawful. They claimed damages for the 
loss caused to them by the disqualification proceedings which had been brought against them. 
 
20 [1995] 2 AC 296. 
21 [1992] 2 NZLR 282. 
22 [1997] IRLR 219 (Q.B.). Mr Baker was a television sales executive. On 28 January 1991, he took up employment with 
Guild Television Ltd. Three weeks later, however, he was offered a lucrative employment by NBC Europe, a 
subsidiary of the American giant General Electric, as director of international sales. The offer, which was contained in 
a letter from GE's human resources manager, was to take effect from 1 March, subject to a satisfactory medical report 
from the company doctor, Dr Kaye. When the doctor advised GE that a blood test on the plaintiff revealed the 
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practitioner retained by a company to carry out pre-employment medical assessments of its 
prospective employees owes a duty of care to those whom he assesses in carrying out his assessment 
and in reporting his conclusion. The defendant medical practitioner was, therefore, under a duty to 
the plaintiff to take reasonable care in carrying out the medical assessment in connection with the job 
offer, and in making a judgment as to the plaintiff's suitability for employment by reference to the 
employers' requirements. It was held to be a duty of care that fulfilled all the legal requirements: 
namely, foreseeability of economic loss, the necessary degree of proximity between the parties and 
the proviso that it should be just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances for a duty to be 
imposed. Not only was it clear that economic loss was a foreseeable consequence of a breach of the 
duty, but there was also sufficient proximity between the parties to give rise to a duty of care, as the 
defendant knew that the plaintiff's employment by the company depended solely on the assessment 
and that to make a non-recommendation could have serious financial consequences. Finally, it was 
just, fair and reasonable for such a duty to be imposed; there was no conflict between the proper 
discharge of the defendant's contractual duty to the prospective employers and any duty to the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff was dependent upon the medical assessment made by the defendant. The 
latter was, however, found not liable, as it was not shown that he had breached his duty of care in his 
assessment of the plaintiff’s fitness for the job.  
 
But in Kapfunde v Abbey National Plc and another23, the Court of Appeal, in considering the same 
question, i.e. the question whether in assessing the appellant’s suitability for employment by Abbey 
National Plc, a medical practitioner, employed by Abbey National for that purpose, owed her a duty 
of care, reached a negative conclusion. The Court held that a duty of care will generally be owed to 
the person to whom a statement is made and who relies on it. In the case of a bank reference or 
medical report, this is normally the person who asks for it or commissions it. A reference by an 
employer, however, is likely to be regarded as provided to the former employee, who is the subject 
of the reference, for his use ‘as a passport to future employment’, rather than as a service to any 
particular prospective new employer. The Court disapproved of the Judge’s conclusion as to the 
existence of a duty of care in Baker v Kaye (supra). The doctor’s advice is given to the employer or 
insurer and not to the applicant for a job, who is a patient only in the sense that he is the subject of 
the examination and advice. The doctor is, therefore, taken to assume responsibility for his advice 
only to the employer or insurer who commissioned it, and not to the patient. 
 
White and another v Jones and others24, is a case where a solicitor was found liable to the intended 
beneficiaries of his client, the testator, who died before the solicitor came round to drawing up a will 
under instructions to confer a benefit on them. The House of Lords (Lord Keith and Lord Mustill 
dissenting) held that where a solicitor accepted instructions to draw up a will and as a result of his 
                                                                                                                                                        
possibility of excess social consumption of alcohol, the offer of employment was withdrawn. The plaintiff sued the 
doctor, alleging negligence in his performance and analysis of the test and his conclusions in his medical report to the 
company. 
23 [1998] WL 1044284 (CA (Civ Div)). 
24 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
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negligence an intended beneficiary under the will was deprived of a legacy, the solicitor was liable 
for the loss of the legacy. Lord Goff and Lord Nolan based their decision on extending the 
assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client in law to an intended beneficiary. But 
they made it clear that this assumption of responsibility existed only if the loss of the beneficiary was 
foreseeable to the solicitor, and if the circumstances of the situation were that there was no 
confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties, and neither the testator nor his estate had a 
remedy against the solicitor. Tort liability was appropriate in such circumstances only because 
otherwise an injustice would occur, as a result of a lacuna in the law and there would be no remedy 
for the loss caused by the solicitor's negligence to the beneficiary. Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord 
Nolan held that the principle of assumption of responsibility should be extended to a solicitor who 
accepted instructions to draw up a will, holding him to be in a special relationship with those 
intended to benefit under it. 
 
White v Jones extended in law the expert adviser’s assumption of responsibility to his client’s 
beneficiaries. This has given rise to the question of whether an expert advising trustees owes a duty 
of care to the beneficiaries of the trust. In the case of Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 25, Lord Nicholls, 
giving the judgment of the Privy Council, said26: 
 
“… it is difficult to identify a compelling reason why, in addition to the duty of skill and care vis-a-vis the 
trustees which the third parties have accepted, or which the law has imposed upon them, third parties 
should also owe a duty of care directly to the beneficiaries”.  
 
In another case, Hogg Robinson Trustees Ltd. and others v J. Alsford Pensions Trustees Ltd. and others27, 
there is further evidence of the Courts being unwilling to generally recognise third-party liability 
for economic loss to beneficiaries, in the absence of a lacuna in the law, similar to that which gave 
ground to the House of Lords to accept the claim of the testator’s beneficiaries in White v Jones. A 
fiduciary relationship (and, therefore, also a special relationship) will, normally, exist only between 
third parties and trustees, and, of course, trustees and beneficiaries. In Hemmens v Wilson Browne 28, 
a settlor instructed a solicitor to draft a document giving the plaintiff an immediately enforceable 
right to call at a future date for a sum of 110,000 pounds. After the settlor had executed a document 
drafted by the solicitor, the latter told the plaintiff that the effect of the document was “akin to a 
trust' but advised her to consult her own solicitors if she had any doubt in the matter. It ought to 
have been known to the solicitor that the document failed to give the plaintiff any enforceable 
right. When the plaintiff called on the settlor to perform his promise he was no longer willing to do 
so and declined to pay her the promised sum. The plaintiff claimed damages for negligence against 
the solicitor. The court held that a solicitor might be held to owe a duty of care to the intended 
beneficiary of an inter vivos transaction who had suffered damage which it was beyond the power 
                                                 
25 [1995] 2 AC 378 (P.C.). 
26 at p. 391. 
27 High Court, Chancery Division, Lindsay J., signed judgment handed down on 19 March 1997. 
28 [1995] Ch 223. 
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of the settlor to put right, but such a duty of care could not be said to exist in all cases of inter vivos 
transactions. Although it was foreseeable that by failing to exercise due care the defendant might 
cause the plaintiff loss, and although there was a sufficient degree of proximity between them, it 
was not” fair, just or reasonable’ to give her a remedy against him since the settlor remained 
capable of fulfilling his original intention and retained a remedy in contract against the solicitor if 
he chose to exercise it (no lacuna in the law as in White v Jones). If the solicitor’s client is alive, the 
client can sue the solicitor for his negligence to confer his benefit on the beneficiary, and this takes 
care of the need to give the beneficiary an independent action in tort29. But the liability of solicitors 
was extended later in Carr-Glynn v Frearsons (a firm),30in a case where they had negligently failed 
to severe a joint tenancy and thus confer a benefit in their client’s will to her niece, on the basis of 
an assumption of responsibility towards the latter (with whom the solicitors had no contract). And 
in the later case of Johnson v Woods & Co31, the court upheld the possibility of a similar assumption 
of responsibility of solicitors towards a company shareholder for his personal loss, although there 
was no lacuna in the law as suggested by White v Jones. 
 
 
3. Concurrence of contract and tort duties 
 
In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, Lord Goff said32:  
 
“an assumption of responsibility coupled with the concomitant reliance may give rise to a tortious duty of 
care irrespective of whether there is a contractual relationship between the parties, and in consequence, 
unless his contract precludes him from doing so, the plaintiff, who has available to him concurrent remedies 
in contract and tort, may choose that remedy which appears to him to be most advantageous”.  
 
The defendants in that case were the providers of services as managers of underwriting syndicates. 
Lord Goff also said33:   
 
“It is however my understanding that by the law in this country contracts for services do contain an implied 
promise to exercise reasonable care (and skill)in the performance of the relevant services…”  
 
And:  
 
“Attempts have been made to explain how doctors and dentists may be concurrently liable 
in tort while other professional men may not be so liable, on the basis that the former cause 
                                                 
29 But in McCullagh v Lane Fox & Partners Ltd [1196] 18 EG 104 , the Court of Appeal held that an estate agent acting for 
a vendor owes a duty of care to the purchaser of property, although not on the facts of that case. 
30 [1998] 4 All E R 225 (C A ).  
31 [1998] WL 1043972 (CA (Civ Div)). 
32 [1995] 2 AC145 at p. 194. 
33 at p. 193. 
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physical damage whereas the latter cause pure economic loss . . . But this explanation is not 
acceptable, if only because some professional men, such as architects, may also be 
responsible for physical damage. As a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why concurrent 
remedies in tort and contract, if available against the medical profession, should also not be 
available against members of other professions, whatever form the relevant damage may 
take.”34  
 
And in Holt and another v Payne Skillington and another35 the Court of Appeal confirmed that where 
there are concurrent claims in contract and tort for professional negligence, it is possible that the 
scope of the duty in tort may be wider than that in contract. 
 
The existence of a contract between plaintiff and defendant may, however, also provide undisputable 
proof of an assumption of a duty of care by the latter to the former; and the recognition of the 
concurrence of contractual and tortious remedies by English law is hardly surprising, in the light of 
the narrow scope of contractual liability. The interesting question, when there is such a concurrence, 
is whether the terms of the contract can be allowed to circumscribe the scope of the duty in tort. This 
would be unacceptable, if the latter is to be seen as arising ex lege (as it normally is). But not so, 
perhaps, if the Tort duty is founded on a voluntary assumption of liability. Voluntary assumption of 
liability in Tort is, however, as we shall now see, a troubled concept.  
 
 
4. How ‘voluntary’ is voluntary assumption of liability?  
 
It is clear from the reasoning in the majority of the leading authorities that voluntary assumption of 
liability in Tort is ‘objective’, meaning that it does not depend on the real will or knowledge of the 
defendant. To that extent, the tort duty that comes from it can be, and is, independent from the will 
of the parties as expressed in any concurrent contract that embodies the assumption of responsibility 
(subject to lawful limitation or exclusion of liability).36  
 
A first important authority is the case of Williams and another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and 
Mistlin 37. The main question in this case was whether a director of a franchisor company is 
personally liable to franchisees for loss which they suffered as a result of negligent advice given to 
them by his company, at the time of the sale of the franchise. At first instance Langley J.38 answered 
                                                 
34 at p. 190. 
35 [1996] 49 Con LR 99.  
36 The present state of English law in the area of liability for negligent statements has been the subject of considerable 
debate and criticism. Writers have criticized the principle of ‘assumption of responsibility’ as resting on a fiction used 
to justify a conclusion that a duty of care exists: see BARKER (1993), HEPPLE (1997), CANE (1996). 
37 [1998] 2 All ER 577. 
38 [1996] BCLC 288. 
 
 
11
InDret 4/2009 Stathis Banakas
 
 
that question in the affirmative, and the majority of the Court of Appeal39 upheld this conclusion and 
dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The dispute arose in the context of a marketing system known as 
business format franchising. This franchising involves a contractual licence under which the 
franchisor permits a franchisee to carry on business under a trade name belonging to the franchisor. 
The franchisor provides advice and assistance to the franchisee about the manner in which the 
franchisee does business and exercises some control over it. In return the franchisee pays stipulated 
fees to the franchisor. Encouraged by a brochure and a prospectus supplied to them by the appellant-
defendant, the respondents-plaintiffs had entered into a franchise agreement with the defendant’s 
company. The respondents took a lease of shop premises and set up business. The turnover proved 
substantially less than predicted by the defendant’s company. The plaintiffs’ business traded at a loss 
over several months and then ceased trading. In the House of Lords, all judges concurred with Lord 
Steyn’s speech, allowing the defendant’s appeal.  
 
Lord Steyn begun with ‘the extended Hedley Byrne principle’, applicable in cases of professional 
liability for the supply of negligent services:  
 
“[t]he governing principles are stated in the leading speech of Lord Goff of Chieveley in Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd40. First, in Henderson's case it was settled that the assumption of responsibility principle 
enunciated in Hedley Byrne ... is not confined to statements but may apply to any assumption of 
responsibility for the provision of services. The extended Hedley Byrne principle is the rationalisation or 
technique adopted by English law to provide a remedy for the recovery of damages in respect of economic 
loss caused by the negligent performance of services. Secondly, it was established that once a case is 
identified as falling within the extended Hedley Byrne principle, there is no need to embark on any further 
inquiry whether it is “fair, just and reasonable” to impose liability for economic loss...Thirdly, and applying 
Hedley Byrne, it was made clear that «reliance upon [the assumption of responsibility] by the other party 
will be necessary to establish a cause of action (because otherwise the negligence will have no causative 
effect). . . “. Fourthly, it was held that the existence of a contractual duty of care between the parties does not 
preclude the concurrence of a tort duty in the same respect”. 
 
Lord Steyn went on to explain what he called ‘the practical application of the extended Hedley Byrne 
principle’. This was firmly based on the idea of assumption of responsibility, itself indicating an 
assumption of the risk of financial loss by the issuer of a statement or advice:  
 
“Two matters require consideration. First, there is the approach to be adopted as to what may in law amount 
to an assumption of risk. This point was elucidated in Henderson's case by Lord Goff of Chieveley. He 
observed, at p.181:  “especially in a context concerned with a liability which may arise under a contract or in 
a situation 'equivalent to contract,' it must be expected that an objective test will be applied when asking the 
question whether, in a particular case, responsibility should be held to have been assumed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff: . . .”.  
 
Lord Steyn pointed out that, also in his view, the basis of liability is not the state of mind of the 
defendant. The test is objective; this means that the primary focus must be on things said or done by 
                                                 
39 [1997] 1 BCLC 131. 
40 [1995] 2 AC 145, [1994] 3 All ER 506. 
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the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff. What was crucial for his Lordship, 
however, was that the assumption of responsibility should have occurred directly, in a bi-lateral 
relationship between defendant and plaintiff. But in the present case there was a triangular position: 
the prospective franchisees, the franchisor company, and the director-defendant. In such a case 
where the personal liability of the director is in question the internal arrangements between a 
director and his company cannot be the foundation of a director's personal liability in tort. ‘The 
inquiry must be’, said Lord Steyn, ‘whether the director, or anybody on his behalf, conveyed directly 
or indirectly to the prospective franchisees that the director assumed personal responsibility towards 
the prospective franchisees’.  
 
But if personal assumption of responsibility is the basis of liability, reliance by the plaintiff on the 
advice or information given is also necessary to establish the causal link between the assumption of 
responsibility and the loss. The test is not, however, simply reliance in fact. ‘The test is’, said Lord 
Steyn, ‘whether the plaintiff could reasonably rely on an assumption of personal responsibility by the 
individual who performed the services on behalf of the company’. In plain words, whether the 
plaintiff relied in fact or not on the defendant’s assumption of responsibility has nothing to do with 
it; what matters is if, in law, he is entitled to so rely, whether, as the mantra of recent judicial 
pronouncements goes, ‘it is just, fair and reasonable’ for him to so rely.41
 
Both assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance are, therefore, normative devices serving 
legal policy; neither rules of law, nor matters of fact. But as Lord Steyn said:  
 
‘Coherence must sometimes yield to practical justice. In any event, the restricted conception of contract in 
English law, resulting from the combined effect of the principles of consideration and Privity of contract, 
was the backcloth against which Hedley Byrne was decided and the principle developed in Henderson. In The 
Pioneer Container [ 1994] 2 AC 324, [ 1994] 2 All ER 250 at p 335 of the former report, Lord Goff of Chieveley 
(giving the judgment of the Privy Council in a Hong Kong appeal) said that it was open to question how 
long the principles of consideration and Privity of contract will continue to be maintained. It may become 
necessary for the House of Lords to re-examine the principles of consideration and Privity of contract. But 
while the present structure of English contract law remains intact the law of tort, as the general law, has to 
fulfil an essential gap-filling role. In these circumstances there was, and is, no better rationalisation for the 
relevant head of tort liability than assumption of responsibility’.  
 
A second important authority is the case of Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc42, 
decided last year. The House of Lords took the opportunity in this case to make important 
pronouncements on the principle of voluntary assumption of liability. In this case, the appellant bank 
Barclays, appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal43 that it owed a duty of care to the 
respondent Customs and Excise to take reasonable care to ensure that no payments were made out of 
customer accounts that were subject to freezing injunctions for owing Customs money. Customs and 
                                                 
41 See more on this in BANAKAS, ‘Tender is the Night: Economic Loss-The Issues’, in E. K. BANAKAS, Ed. (1996). 
 
42 [2007] 1 A.C. 181, [2006] UKHL 28; Gerald BYRNE (2008). 
 
43 ([2004] EWCA Civ 1555, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2082).  
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Excise had intended to bring proceedings for payment of outstanding VAT tax against two 
companies that held these accounts with Barclays Bank. The accounts had been substantially in 
credit. Customs had obtained the freezing injunctions over the accounts specifically prohibiting 
disposal of any of the debtor companies' assets up to a stated amount and had notified Barclays of 
the injunctions by faxing to the Bank copies of the freezing orders. Hours afterwards, Barclays had 
authorised from the bank's payment centre, not from the branches where the accounts were held, 
transfers of substantial sums from the accounts. After obtaining judgments against the debtors who 
defaulted, Customs and Excise claimed damages against Barclays in the sums paid out in breach of 
the injunctions. The House of Lords allowed the Bank’s appeal. Reflecting on the Bank’s Duty of 
Care to Customs and Excise, the House of Lords held that the presence or absence of a voluntary 
assumption of responsibility did not necessarily provide the answer in all cases, although it might be 
decisive in many situations. In the absence of any single touchstone of liability and where a court 
was faced with a novel situation, the court had to apply the threefold test in Caparo Industries Plc v 
Dickman44. This test required three conditions to be satisfied, before a Duty of care could be found to 
exist: That the claimant’s loss had been foreseeable to the defendant, that there was sufficient 
proximity between them, and that it was ‘fair and reasonable’ to impose a duty on the defendant. 
According to the House of Lords, when a lower court granted Customs' applications for freezing 
injunctions against assets of their debtors, their purpose was to protect Customs by preventing the 
debtor companies from parting with their assets. The freezing injunctions were directed at the two 
debtor companies. Barclays Bank, a third party, would be in contempt of court only if it knowingly 
failed to freeze customer accounts subject to the freezing injunctions and authorised transfers of 
sums from the accounts after being notified of the court orders. The failure to operate a system for 
freezing accounts did not mean that Barclays was liable to Customs who had obtained the orders. 
Notification by Customs of the freezing orders imposed a duty on Barclays to respect the order of the 
court but did not of itself generate a Duty of Care to Customs45. More significantly, the House of 
Lords held that there was nothing that could be regarded as a voluntary assumption of responsibility 
by Barclays Bank for the way in which it would go about freezing the debtor companies' accounts, 
and there was nothing that involved Barclays in entering into any kind of relationship with Customs 
that required it to exercise appropriate care. Furthermore, the House of Lords found that Customs 
and Excise were not entitled to rely on the Bank taking care of their interests, reliance that, under the 
formulation of the principle of assumption of responsibility in Williams and another as analysed in this 
paper, is necessary for the principle to apply. The House of Lords also pointed out that the parties, 
Barclays and Customs and Excise, were about as far from being in a relationship “equivalent to 
contract” as they could be, and held, applying the Caparo test, that in the circumstances, the parties 
were not in a relationship of proximity and it would not be fair, just and reasonable to hold that 
Barclays Bank owed a duty of care to Customs and Excise. 
 
In their concern about extending liability for professional negligence too far, the House of Lords have 
                                                 
44 [1990] 2 A.C. 605 HL. 
 
45 Interestingly, but not directly for the purposes of this paper, the Law Lords reflected on the wider issue of a 
common law duty of care arising from a judicially created legal duty, in comparison with a common law duty of care 
arising from legal duty created by statute. 
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in this case potentially added a subjective gloss to the principle of assumption of responsibility that 
distorts substantially the clarity of its objective formulation in Williams and another (supra), by Lord 
Steyn. It must be true that Barclays Bank could not be seen as having assumed responsibility 
voluntarily (the parties were, as the Court held, ‘..about as far from being in a relationship 
“equivalent to contract” as they could be..’), having only been obliged by the freezing orders to block 
the debtors’ accounts in an action in which the Bank had no material interest, other than avoiding 
being potentially criminally liable for contempt of Court, if intentionally violating the orders. I 
submit, however, that it is not necessary to see the judgment in this case as introducing a subjective, 
voluntary, element to the concept of assumption of responsibility, except to the extent that, as 
already implied in Galoo (supra), such an assumption is based on the presence of a material interest 
that the defendant had in acting or making a statement to the claimant. The presence of such an 
interest makes assumption of responsibility in the act or statement ‘voluntary’ only in the sense that 
the pursuit of the interest itself is ‘voluntary’46. But the defendant should not be able to deny the 
implication of an assumption of responsibility in cases where such an interest is present, unless she 
has, expressly and validly, excluded responsibility. This, it is further submitted, is the proper way to 
interpret the impact of the judgment in Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank, taking due account of the 
need to control the scope of liability for professional negligence and sanction claims arising in 
circumstances where it is clear that the defendant had been pursuing a material interest with the 
claimant in causing loss to the claimant by his negligence47. 
 
 
5. Voluntary assumption of liability in tort beyond economic loss 
 
Most interestingly, the courts have been developing the idea of assumption of responsibility as a 
general basis of tort liability, on which the existence of a Duty of Care will from now on depend. 
                                                 
46 This can explain the apparent contradiction in the Chancery Court’s reasoning in Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd 
[2008] EWHC 454 (Ch) (2008) 105(14) L.S.G. 28, decided after Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays, that the 
relevant principles derived from Barclays were that the voluntary assumption test was most influential where the 
parties' relationship had the indicia of contract save for consideration, the test was objective and that something was 
no less voluntary because it had been done pursuant to a perceived statutory duty or code of conduct. 
 
47 It is worth noting that the popularity of the notion of voluntary assumption of responsibility among claimants as a 
basis for arguing the existence of a Duty of Care continues undiminished, across the country and across levels of 
jurisdiction, despite a general lack of success on the facts : see, among recent cases, Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd 
(OH) Court of Session (Outer House) 2008 S.L.T. 634, [2008] CSOH 88 (Solicitors failing to evacuate survivorship 
clause in disposition had assumed no responsibility and owed no duty of care to executor nominate); Newby v Leeds 
City Council 2008 WL 2696981 (CC) (local authority responsible for assessing a person’s means so as to decide if she 
would have to contribute to the cost of her residential care was advising claimants within the context of its statutory 
function and there was no special relationship from which a voluntary assumption of responsibility could be 
inferred); Whitehead v Searle [2008] EWCA Civ 285 (solicitors’ breach of duty of care to deceased client was not enough 
to entitle the claimant, the deceased’s partner, in his capacity as an administrator of the estate of his partner, to 
damages in his own right, as the defendant had at no stage proffered to shoulder any task, or undertake any duty, 
had assumed no responsibility and, thus, in all the circumstances it was not fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty 
of care). 
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Besides the well-established general principle that a voluntary assumption of responsibility may give 
rise to a Duty of Care to protect from physical harm48, two important cases have applied this idea in 
relation to claims other than a purely economic loss; first, in a case involving psychiatric injury, and 
second, a case involving a physical handicap (dyslexia), both cases of public authority liability, in 
itself a thorny issue under English law. 
 
In Leach v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire49, the Court of Appeal accepted that voluntary assumption 
of responsibility could create a duty of care to protect from psychiatric harm. The plaintiff had asked 
by the police to assist in the interrogation of a serial killer, by being present as ‘an appropriate adult’, 
during police interviews and also in the police cell where he was kept, as required by the practice 
code of the police; she suffered severe psychological trauma while listening to him confessing 
gruesome details of his murders, often in the middle of the night, but was at no point either offered, 
or advised to get, expert help or counselling. The Court refused to strike out her claim as one 
disclosing no action in law, pointing out that there should be no difference between physical and 
psychiatric harm when an assumption of responsibility is concerned. Such an assumption of 
responsibility, leading to the creation of a Duty of Care to advise the claimant to seek proper 
counselling support while assisting the police, was to be objectively recognised by the law in a case 
like this, where the defendant police force was deriving for free, without any consideration paid by 
them in return, the benefit of the plaintiff’s assistance in their inquiries. 
  
The second case was concerned more directly with the difficult question of the extent of public 
authority liability in Tort for failures in the provision of statutory services. In four judgments50 , often 
referred to by the name of one of the parties in one of them, Phelps , on related appeals issues, the 
House of Lords held that a person exercising a particular skill or profession might owe a duty of care 
in its performance to those who might foreseeable be injured if due care and skill were not exercised. 
Such duty did not depend on the existence of a contractual relationship between the person causing 
and the person suffering the damage. In Phelps, an educational psychologist was held to be a person 
owing such a duty of care and the fact that she owed duties to the local education authority who 
employed her did not mean that she did not also owe a duty to a child she was asked to assess, 
especially when the educational psychologist was specifically asked to advice as to the assessment of 
and future provision for a child and it was clear that the child's parents and teachers would follow 
that advice. The House of Lords held in such circumstances a duty of care prima facie arose. As a 
result, the local education authority was also prima facie vicariously liable for a breach of that duty, 
notwithstanding that the breach bad occurred in the course of the performance of a statutory duty 
and that a breach of the authority's duty under the relevant legislation51 did not itself create a right of 
                                                 
48 On which see Winfield & Jolowicz TORT, 17th edition by W V H Rogers, London 2006, pp. 170 f. 
 
49 [1999] 1 All E.R. 215 (CA). 
50 Phelps v Hillington L B C; Anderton v Clwyd CC; G (A Minor) v Bromley L B C; Jarvis v Hampshire C C, [2000] 4 All ER 
504 (HL). But see also DN v Greenwich LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1659; [2005] 1 F.C.R. 112 (CA (Civ Div)), where the 
Court of Appeal showed some concern about the possible scope of Phelps, on which see now Donal NOLAN (2007). 
 
51 The Education Acts 1944 and 1981. 
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damages. The relationship between the child plaintiff and the educational psychologist employed by 
the defendant authority and the task she bad been doing had created the necessary nexus to place the 
psychologist under a duty of care to the plaintiff. The House of Lords further held that the trial judge 
had been entitled to hold her in breach of that duty and that the authority was vicariously liable for 
that breach. Interestingly, the House of Lords also held that a failure to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of a congenital defect such as dyslexia was capable of constituting “personal injuries to 
a person”52.  
 
Other judgments in the same bundle of cases reported together with Phelps went on to affirm that 
teachers owed a duty at common law to exercise the skill and care of reasonable teachers in 
providing education for their pupils in relation to their needs. This duty, of all those concerned, arose 
out of a voluntary assumption of responsibility in their professional actions.  
 
These judgments have created controversy. Voluntary assumption of responsibility has been seen as 
a basis on which public authority liability can be taken too far. Although they anticipated at the time 
the Human Rights Act 2000, which came into force on the 2nd October 2000, introducing into English 
law statutory rights corresponding to those of the European Convention of Human Rights. New 
statutory rights, such the right to a fair trial, to health, and to private and family life, are now firmly 
embedded into UK law. These rights are generally seen by lawyers in the United Kingdom as 
signalling an unavoidable expansion of public authority liability in all areas of defective public 
services or negligence in the exercise of powers. But concern on public authority liability finally 
produced a backlash, especially as voluntary assumption of responsibility was used by the courts in 
considering claims for injuries in using leisure activities voluntarily offered free of charge to the 
public53, or in recreational or educational school trips, voluntarily organised by school staff for their 
pupils. A section of an Act of Parliament intended to restrict the scope of such Tort duties, a rare 
example of legislative intervention in the development of basic Tort principles by the courts, now 
provides that  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
52 For the purpose of section 33(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981which applies to personal injury claims. 
 
53 See Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47: Congleton Borough Council appealed against a decision of the Court 
of Appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 309, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1120) that, as the owner and occupier of a country park, it had owed 
a duty of care to Tomlinson, when he dived into the shallow water at the edge of a lake and struck his head on the 
bottom. Although the claimant’s claim was rejected on an adverse for the claimant’s case interpretation of the 
occupier’s duty to trespassers under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 s. 1, the House of Lords was clearly concerned 
about the so-called ‘compensation culture’ hitting local authority services, noting, significantly, that Tomlinson was a 
person of full capacity who had voluntarily chosen to engage in an activity which had inherent dangers. The case can 
be criticized as an illustration of the wider iniquities of the ‘lottery of damages’ system operated by the fault principle, 
as Mr Tomlinson narrowly missed a substantial payout for an extremely severe personal injury and the resulting 
incapacity on policy grounds that were far wider than what the individual merits of his claim could have been under 
other circumstances, for example, in a car accident. 
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‘A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in determining whether the 
defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a standard of care (whether by taking precautions 
against a risk or otherwise), have regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might– 
 
(a) prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent or in a 
particular way, or 
(b) discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity’54. 
 
The Act is thus worded to acknowledge perceived public concern about the deterrent effect of 
expanding liability for activities with social utility, on the basis of a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility. This social utility has, however, been always a factor in the cost-benefit analysis on 
which breach of duty is decided in common law, so the Act, perhaps not surprisingly, adds nothing 
substantial to the common law in this section. But it can, nevertheless, be seen as a political 
declaration of the need for courts not to pursue an expansion of public authority liability in 
particular, under the influence of the idea of voluntary assumption of responsibility. This need is also 
keenly felt by some of the most influential senior judges in the UK. Lord Hoffmann, generally 
concerned with the expansion of negligence liability for all kinds of risks and injuries55, and more 
particularly concerned with protecting public authorities from a possible onslaught of claims under 
the Human Rights Act, has strongly criticised recently the potential scope of Phelps56
 
 
6. Voluntary assumption of liability- a new uniform field? 
 
Could it be that English law is developing a substantial amount of jurisprudence of a sui generis 
liability, neither contractual nor based on the existence of a positive Duty of Care57, applied by law on 
grounds of general considerations of social utility? It is certainly a development with a relational 
vision of tort liability that blurs the boundaries of Contract and Tort, which I had the youthful 
arrogance to suggest in my doctoral thesis some twenty years ago58 and which one of the examiners, 
Andre Tunc, had described at the time in the viva voce as ‘péchés de jeunesse’. The assumption of 
responsibility is implied objectively by law in cases where the relationship between the parties, while 
falls short of contract, is seen as one of close proximity, in the light of the seriousness of the mutual 
interests of the parties that have brought them together and have exposed them to the risk of injury if 
due care is not shown. As stated at the beginning of this paper, English law needs the principle of 
                                                 
54 Compensation Act 2006, Chapter 29, part 1, Standard of care, Section 1, ‘Deterrent effect of potential liability’. 
55 As is also evident in his leading judgment in Tomlinson v Congleton BC, above. 
 
56 Lord Hoffmann said in delivering the annual FA Mann lecture of 2007: ‘I do not think it is too much to say...that the 
decision in Phelps has been a disaster for public education...[I]t gives the young drug-addicted petty criminal the 
opportunity, at State expense, to blame the State education system for his entire failure in life, together with the 
outside chance of picking up about £40,000’: see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1568007/Brief-
encounters.html#continue (last visited 3.7.2008). 
 
57 Nicholas J. MCBRIDE (2004). 
 
58 E.K. BANAKAS (1989). 
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assumption of responsibility because of a (still) narrow concept of Contractual liability. The principle 
offers a natural path to a novel kind of civil liability, besides the traditional two other paths of 
Contractual and Tortious liability, which shows in its construction elements of both of those other 
two. It is objective59, i.e. it does not depend on proof of an actual intention to assume responsibility 
by the defendant, and proof of absence of such an actual intention by the defendant is no defence60. 
It would, indeed, have been a paradox if voluntary assumption of responsibility in Tort were not to 
be objectively established, in view of the fact that even contractual undertakings are subject to 
objective judicial construction. So, in Tort, rather than the intention of the defendant, it is the 
circumstances of her relationship with the plaintiff, including, most importantly, any interest or 
benefit of the former in inducing the latter’s conduct, that determine the existence of an assumption 
of responsibility in the eyes of the law. Tort liability arising from assumption of responsibility finds 
its most important application as an additional condition of the presence of a duty in cases of non-
physical harm, whether economic or psychological/psychiatric harm. Non-physical harm, important 
as it might be, cannot be compensated on a simple principle of foreseeability, for reasons that 
concern both its potentially uncontrollable nature, and political and moral parameters imposed by 
the structure of western open-market societies on the legal system61. The idea of assumption of 
responsibility is obviously seen as offering the means of a measured and controllable response to the 
need for compensation in deserving cases. These are the cases where the defendant cannot be seen to 
escape the consequences of her negligence, because of her interest in the plaintiff’s reliance on her. In 
these cases, and to borrow the formula consistently used by judges in all recent English cases, the 
defendant must be liable because it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ that she should be. This formula 
implies that the actual circumstances of the case carry the harmful conduct of the defendant across 
the line of what fair play is in an open market society. ‘Fair and just’ must not only be that which is 
morally acceptable given the relative position of the parties, but, also, it seems (or it ought to be so), 
what is consistent with a healthy and efficient social and economic conduct. Thus, it is fair and 
reasonable in that sense that professional people do not escape liability in cases in which they act 
without a fee, if they have a strong personal interest in the plaintiff’s reliance, and if, for the wider 
benefit of society and the market, this is a case of a kind in which third parties must be encouraged to 
rely on their skills. And it is fair and reasonable that professional people are not liable for acting 
without a fee when the plaintiff’s interest in their action and the nature of is object clearly do not 
justify such a ‘free lunch’. ‘Reasonable’ must be that which is, in the circumstances, practical. It may 
be practical to impose liability, because the defendant is, or could have easily been insured; and it 
may not be practical to impose liability because of the amount of risk involved and the actual 
conditions of the market (including the cost of insurance). An additional important practical 
consideration, must be that the imposition of liability does not interfere with other agreements or 
conventions binding on the parties, or contractual relations based on internationally agreed 
commercial contractual structures, as illustrated by the case of Marc Rich & Co AG and others v Bishop 
                                                 
59 Subject, of course, to what was said supra in relation to the judgment of the House of Lords in Customs and Excise v 
Barclays Bank. 
 
60 Thus, and in my reading of the tone of the case law, any exclusion or limitation of liability would be subject to the 
usual control, also in a consumer relationship. 
61 See more on this in BANAKAS, ‘Tender is the Night: Economic Loss-The Issues’, in E.K. BANAKAS, Ed. (1996). 
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Rock Marine Co Ltd and others, (The Nicholas H) 62..
 
This paper started with a question: is it a paradox that voluntary assumption of responsibility is 
increasingly held as a foundation for Tort liability in Negligence? Further questions did arise: Does 
this imply that Tort liability comes even closer than ever to be based on the same premise as 
contractual liability, i.e. the willingness of a person to undertake the responsibility of their conduct? 
Does this mean that Tort liability, whether for intentional or non-intentional conduct, is becoming 
more relational, personal in its moral foundation, closer to the idea of personal moral responsibility 
than ever before? Where does that all leave the boundary between Contract and Tort? 
 
The last question seems to be the easier to answer: the boundary between Contract and Tort becomes 
thinner. In one sense, lack of consideration will not be an insurmountable obstacle if, as argued in 
this paper, harm results from a voluntary assumption of responsibility, primarily evidenced in 
conduct in pursuit of a material interest in a direct two-party non-contractual relationship. In another 
sense, the province of Tort liability for unpremeditated harm regardless of such conduct, i.e. 
regardless of conduct that may be seen as arising from such a voluntary assumption of responsibility, 
appears to be shrieking. But all this does not necessarily mean that liability, contractual or tortious is 
becoming more voluntary in a subjective sense. As Lord Hoffmann reminded us recently in the case 
of The Achilleas from which the opening quotation of this paper comes, the intention of the parties 
voluntarily undertaking contractual liability must be objectively ascertained. And voluntary 
assumption of liability in Tort is also clearly objectively ascertained, as said above, in the pursuit of a 
material interest, or the existence of a statutory duty or of code of conduct or, quite simply, on a 
purely normative basis that it would be ‘just, fair and reasonable’ to do so. It is worth repeating here, 
because the law is not as crystal clear as it should be about this, that it would be very strange indeed, 
if voluntary assumption of liability in Contract is objectively ascertained but not so in Tort. Can Tort 
liability ever be conceived to be more dependant on a person’s subjective will than Contractual 
liability? Voluntary assumption of responsibility does not imply, therefore, a potential 
transformation of tortious liability into a kind of voluntary, subjective responsibility close to that 
traditionally associated with contractual undertakings. It is only to the extent that contractual 
undertakings are also ascertained objectively, that voluntary assumption of responsibility in Tort 
brings Contract and Tort closer together than ever before. 
                                                 
62 [1996] 1 AC 211, [1995] 3 All ER 307, [1995] 2 WLR 227, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 299 (HL). In this case the question was 
whether a vessel classification society owed a duty of care to a third party, the owners of cargo laden on a vessel, 
arising from the careless performance of a survey of a damaged vessel by the surveyor of the classification society, 
which resulted in the vessel being allowed to sail and subsequently sinking. Lord Steyn, with whom the majority of 
the House of Lords agreed, concluded that the recognition of a duty of care would be unfair, unjust and unreasonable 
as against the ship owners who would ultimately have to bear the cost of holding classification societies liable, such 
consequence being at variance with the bargain between ship owners and cargo owners based on an internationally 
agreed contractual structure. It would also be unfair, unjust and unreasonable towards classification societies, notably 
because they act for the collective welfare and unlike ship owners they would not have the benefit of any limitation 
provisions. The then existing system provided cargo owners with the protection of the Hague Rules or Hague Visby 
Rules. That protection was limited but any shortfall was readily insurable, and this led the judge to hold that the 
‘lesser injustice is done by not recognising a duty of care’. 
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